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ABSTRACT
There are many factors that influence whether a political leader exits out of office or
remains in power. In this thesis, we evaluate the impact of one important factor, income
inequality, on the survival prospects of the leader using data for 152 countries for the
period 1962 - 2015. We use a linear probability model, a logit model, and a Cox
Proportional Hazard Model, all of which indicate that higher income inequality increases
the probability of leader survival. To address the potential endogeneity of income
inequality, I use a simultaneous equations model and the results hold. The results are also
robust to controlling for a host ofleader-, party-, and country-level variables, as well as
the bimodal nature of income inequality. Evidence is also given for polity type, which is
the degree to which a country is democratic, as an important factor in simultaneously
determining income inequality and political survival.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
Does an equitable economy increase the likelihood that national leaders will remain in
office? The impact of the state of the economy on political survival is a question of
fundamental importance, but there have been relatively few research topics addressing
this issue. One measure of an equitable economy is income inequality which, usually
measured by the Gini coefficient, refers to the extent to which income is distributed in an
uneven manner among a population. This thesis attempts to answer the question of
whether this unequal distribution has any impact on whether a leader retains her position.
By income, we mean the revenue streams from wages, salaries, interests on a savings
account, dividends from shares of stock, rent, and profits from selling something for more
than you paid for it. Unlike wealth statistics, income figures do not include the values of
home, stock, or other possessions. However, income inequality does follow the principle
of unequal distribution. It's winner-take-all, where the top 1 percent have as much loot as
the bottom 50 percent - and where the richest eighty-five people have as much as the
bottom three and a half billion (Global Wealth Report, 2015). This same brutal principle
of unequal distribution applies outside the financial domain - anywhere that creative
production is required. The majority of scientific papers are published by a very small
group of scientists. Just a handful of authors sell all the books. A million and a half
separately titled books sell each year in the US. However, only five hundred of these sell
more than a hundred thousand copies (Fenner et al., 2010). A tiny proportion of
musicians produces almost all the recorded commercial music. In 2016, the most popular
artist, Drake, was streamed 6.1 billion times, followed by Rihanna (3.3 billion streams),
5

Twenty One Pilots (2.7 billion streams) and The Weeknd (2.6 billion streams). Moving
down a hundred places from Drake, the 101 st ranked group was the California band Los
Tigres de Norte, which was streamed 0.5 billion times, or less than 10 percent as much as
Drake.
Technology has certainly widened inequality in the music industry, but unequal
distribution prevailed even in the 15th century. Just four classical composers (Bach,
Beethoven, Mozart, and Tchaikovsky) wrote almost all the music played by modern
orchestras. Bach, for his part, composed so prolifically that it would take decades of work
merely to hand-copy his scores, yet only a small fraction of his work is commonly
performed, thus demonstrating the law of unequal distribution again.
This principle is sometimes known as Price's law, after Derek J. de Solla Price, the
researcher who discovered its application in science in 1963. However, the basic
principle had been discovered much earlier by Vilfredo Pareto (1848 - 1923), who
noticed its applicability to wealth distribution in the early twentieth century, and it
appears true for every society ever studied, regardless of governmental form. It also
applies to the population of cities (a very small number have almost all the people), the
mass of heavenly bodies (a very small number hoard all the matter), and the frequency of
words in a language (90 percent of communication occurs using just 500 words).
Given this natural tendency for unequal distribution to occur, why do we study
inequality? Numerous literatures in this field have pointed out that inequality in terms of
income and wealth, is a self-feeding beast. Corruption and inequality feed off each other,
creating a vicious cycle between corruption, unequal distribution of power in society, and
unequal distribution of income and wealth. As the Panama papers showed, it is still far
6

too easy for the rich and powerful to exploit the opaqueness of the global financial
system to enrich themselves at the expense of the public good. Grand corruption cases,
from Petrobras and Odebrecht in Brazil to Ukranian ex-president Viktor Yanukovych,
show how collusion between businesses and politicians denies national economies of
billions of dollars of revenues that were siphoned off to benefit the few at the expense of
the many. This kind of systemic grand corruption violates human rights, prevents
sustainable development and fuels social exclusion.
A society with relatively high income inequality might be an equitable society, and
wouldn't be a problem, if the observed inequality were the outcome of an entirely fair
process - in which some worked harder or took more economic risks with resultant
greater economic gains than others However, in many countries, the operation of legal,
political and regulatory institutions is undermined by the wealthy and the powerful for
their own benefits (Glaeser et al., 2002). If one person is sufficiently richer than another,
and courts are corruptible, then the legal system will favor the rich, not the just. Likewise,
if political and regulatory institutions can be moved by wealth or influence, they will
favor the established, and not the efficient.
Whether the income inequality of a country systematically affects the abilities of leaders
to succeed in their positions is of considerable consequence, and of great interest to
policy makers, domestic participants in the political process, outsiders who wish to
encourage or discourage leadership transitions, and others. Even Kuznets in his famous
paper about economic growth and income inequality followed his conclusions with the
question, 'Can the political framework of the underdeveloped societies withstand the
strain which further widening of income inequality is likely to generate?'
7

In this thesis, we hypothesize that higher income inequality leads to higher survival
prospects of political leaders. We measure income inequality with the widely used Gini
Index. In societies infected with crony capitalism, a widening gap between the high
income and the low-income people incentivizes the rich to maintain the status quo.
Political leaders, who most of the times themselves are on the upper end of the income
distribution, employ rent seeking behavior through lobbying and appeal to the rich. In
return, they provide benefits to their supporters, whether in the form of tax breaks,
leniency in the courts, and even outright cronyism.
We might be inclined to put the blame on those political and regulatory institutions, for
being fallible to corruption and not doing what they were designed for. We're also often
appalled by how sly and dishonest most politicians are. However, politicians, who are
also human, do respond to certain incentives, and in this, lies a potential endogeneity
problem in our thesis.
In fact, the self-interested calculations and actions of rulers are the driving force behind
all of politics. In 2014, Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff' s party had funneled some
funds to pay off politicians, buy their votes and help with political campaigns, which later
led to the Petrobras scandal. Even excluding corruption cases, politicians act on their own
interest. Amidst all the debate about national interest, what did President Obama worry
about in formulating his Afghan Policy? If he did not announce a timetable for
withdrawal from Afghanistan, he would lose support from his Democratic electoral base
(Simon and Schuster, 2010). Similarly, President Kennedy was concerned that if he took
no action in what became the Cuban missile crisis, he would be impeached, and the
Democrats would pay a heavy price in the 1962 midterm elections (Norton, 1969).
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National interest might have been on each of their minds, but their personal political
welfare was front and center.
To understand why politicians do what politicians do, we need to read and remember the
words of Niccolo Machiavelli, a late 15th century political advisor and political theorist
who argued that we shouldn't think that politicians are immoral and simply bad for lying
and dissembling and maneuvering. In his view, 'A good politician isn't one who is
friendly, honest or kind. It's someone who knows how to defend, enrich and bring honor
to the state."
Machiavelli in his books, the Prince and the Discourses, addressed the central problem of
politics: it is almost impossible to be both a good politician and a good person in a
traditional Christian sense. The overwhelming responsibility of a good prince is to defend
the state from external and internal threats: to stable governance. While it will be
theoretically be wonderful for a leader to be both loved and obeyed, a Prince should
always aim to inspire terror, for this is what ultimately keeps people in check.
Machiavelli's Christian contemporaries had suggested that leaders should be merciful,
peaceful, generous, and tolerant. They thought that being a good politician was the same
as being a good Christian. But Machiavelli argued that there is an incompatibility
between good Christian ethics and good governance.
Girolamo Savanorola was a Dominican friar, who'd briefly come to be the ruler of
Florence in 1494. He'd come to power promising to build the city of God on Earth. He
preached against the excesses and tyranny of Medici government, and even managed to
rule Florence as a peaceful, democratic, and relatively honest state. However, his tenure
couldn't last. Because in Machiavelli's view, it was based on the weakness of being
9

'good' in a Christian sense. Once his regime became a threat to the corrupt Pope
Alexander, he was captured and tortured, then hanged and burned before the public. This,
Machiavelli argued, is what tends to happen to the nice guys in politics.
The first and foremost priority of a leader is to survive in office. Mesquita and Smith
(2011) argue that "Ruling is about staying in power, not about good governance." To this
end, leaders buy support by rewarding their essential backers relative to others. Through
taxation, leaders have the resources to enrich their most essential supporters. Taxation,
usually in autocratic settings, redistributes from those outside the coalition (the poor) to
those inside the coalition (the rich). Autocratic systems demonstrate this principle, for
here, people are rich solely because they are in the winning coalition, and others are poor
because they are not. Philip Chiyangwa, a protege of Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe had
stated it bluntly, "I am rich because I belong to Zanu-PF [Mugabe's ruling party]." When
the coalition changes, so does who is rich and who is poor.
In addition to examining the significance of income inequality on affecting the ability of
a national leader to retain his or her position, this thesis will also examine their
simultaneous relationship. Leaders do seem to have an incentive to influence the
economic system. Income inequality might be a part of that system, or it might even be
directly influenced by the leader in power.
Using a lagged income inequality variable might help remove the problem of endogeneity
since political leaders cannot influence the income inequality of the years before they
were in a position of power. However, using a lagged version of a very slow moving
variable such as income inequality might not make much difference at all. Furthermore,
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endogeneity may persist since it may be the entire political system (or other variables for
that matter) due to which political survival and income inequality may be linked.
Methods to address potential endogeneity with the full detail of the model will be
presented in later sections. The next section, Section 2, will discuss the theory and
existing evidence on income inequality and leadership change.
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CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Income Inequality and short term political survival prospects
There may be a number of reasons why greater income inequality may decrease the
probability of political survival. First, greater income inequality may make the majority
of the population, who are likely to be on the lower end of the income distribution graph,
unhappy with the incumbent leaders. This unhappiness may decrease public ratings of the
leaders, strengthen the opposition party, or even cause a revolution.
Secondly, higher income inequality generates a highly skewed income distribution graph,
with a small fraction of population at the top income earning tier, while leaving a large
number of population at the bottom. In a true democracy, this majority of the population
are likely to blame the incumbent leaders for this great divide, instead of capitalism itself.
Naturally, the incumbent leaders may be excommunicated, or to be less dramatic, voted
out of office. Olson ( 1963) and Huntington ( 1968, 1991) have argued that income
inequality, caused by rapid economic growth, could strain the social fabric, potentially
leading to political instability.
However, we should refrain from wishful thinking. It might not be so easy to remove a
political leader. Mere unhappiness might not be enough. Greater income inequality is
often a symptom of corruption. If everyone in the political sphere is corrupt, leading to or
benefitting from large income inequality, the incumbent leaders' political survival may
not be influenced by the public. Further, a communist country (or even a socialist one)
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may not be entirely democratic. A country like North Korea, would have no facility to
change their political leaders.
Or perhaps, there is no systematic relationship between income inequality and leadership
change. If members of the electorate believe that national leaders have little impact on the
income inequality, or if they are able to directly judge the leader's performance, their
support for the leader may be unrelated to the income inequality.
However, there are more complications in formulating a model that could provide an
answer. There is evidence that political factors affect the economy, (since leadership does
matter) meaning that the direction of causality is unlikely to be one-way. Barro (1991),
Alesina et al. ( 1996), Brunetti ( 1997), and Przeworski et al. (2000), find that political
instability is harmful to the economy. Political instability may follow protests,
uncertainty, and low investment, thus hurting the economic growth rate. This decrease in
the economic growth rate might lower income inequality, thus potentially giving the
illusion that lower income inequality leads to a decrease in the probability of political
survival.
Income inequality is also shown to be correlated with economic growth. Berg et al.
(2018) show that lower net inequality is robustly correlated with faster and more durable
growth, after controlling for the level of redistribution. They use two econometrics
approach: first, the effect on medium term growth, and second, the duration of growth
spells. For the former, they find higher inequality lowers growth, and that redistribution
has a tiny and statistically insignificant effect. For the latter, they find higher inequality
has a statistically significant relationship with the duration of growth spells. Furthermore,
inequality has shown to intensify the financial cycle that leads to crisis risk (Rajan, 2010).
13

In an unequal society, through the influence of the rich, political and economic factors
allow financial excess to increase out of control (Stiglitz, 2010). The crisis risk will
eventually lead to economic shocks, and in an unequal society, there is less social
consensus required to adjust in the face of these shocks (Easterly, 2007; Berg et al, 2012).
Further still, there may be other variables that may affect both political survival and
income inequality in the country. These variables could take the form of institutions,
government policies, global events such as the end of the Cold War or the recession of
2008, and expectations concerning political stability. Five centuries and a half earlier,
Niccolo Machiavelli (1532) observed that an autocratic ruler lasts longer in office than a
democratic ruler, and advised in his famous book, the Prince, that a ruler is better off
feared than loved. Indeed, the regime type of a country may also be one of those variables
in influencing political survival.
In Machiavelli's view, whoever desires to establish a kingdom or principally where
liberty and equality prevail, will equally fail, unless he withdraws from that general
equality a number of the boldest and most ambitious spirits, and makes gentlemen of
them, not merely in name but in fact, by giving them castles and possessions, as well as
money and subjects; so that surrounded by these he may be able to retain his power. In
this way, inequality may cause higher chances of political survival.
Echoing Machiavelli, in "The Dictator's Handbook", Mesquita and Smith (2011) state
five rules that leaders should use to stay in power: ( 1) The smaller the winning coalition,
the fewer people to satisfy to remain in control. (2) Having a large nominal selectorate
gives a pool of potential people to replace dissenters in coalition. (3) Maintain control of
revenue flows to redistribute to your friends. (4) But only pay friends enough that they
14

will not consider overthrowing you and at the same time little enough so that they depend
on you. (5) Don't take your friends' money and redistribute it to the masses.
The fifth rule seems extremely pertinent to our research. Mesquita and Smith (2011) have
argued that redistribution efforts by a leader might be their own undoing. Although they
did not study income inequality, one can infer that high inequality might aid in political
survival. In a podcast they did with EconTalk host Russ Roberts (2016), they present a
fascinating yet depressing positive correlation between the reputation of an American
president and the number of people dying in wars while that president is in office. They
argue that the decision of how and when to go to war is made in self-interested ways
rather than in consideration of what is best for the nation. In parallel ways, redistribution
efforts to decrease inequality are also made in self-interested ways rather than the
nation's best interest.
Even in democracies, the notion that inequality should be at least partially self-correcting
has not found empirical support. Meltzer and Richard ( 1981) present a model where
increased inequality leads the median voter to demand more redistribution. Redistribution
is limited, however, because higher rates of taxation reduce the labor supply.
Furthermore, in any economy, unequal turnout or unequal political power can create a
situation where the pivotal voter under majority rule may have greater income than the
median. When a society has large numbers of relatively poor residents without voting
rights, as arises with substantial immigration, redistribution will be limited even when all
those enfranchised people participate fully (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal, 2006).
The impact of the type of polity on inequality and political survival is clear, even though
the direction of the effect is debated. Bonica et al. (2013) present possible reasons why
15

the US political system has during the last few decades failed to counterbalance rising
inequality. One reason is that both Republican and Democratic parties have experienced
an ideological shift towards acceptance of a form of a free market capitalism, which
offers less support for government provision of redistribution. Another reason is that the
rich have been able to use their resources to influence electoral, legislative, and
regulatory process through campaign contributions, lobbying and revolving door
employment of politicians and bureaucrats. This suggests a simultaneous relation
between political leaders, income inequality and the type of polity itself.
Only a modicum of research has addressed the potential endogeneity of political survival.
Burke (2012) used commodity prices, export partner growth, precipitation and rainfall as
instruments to address the possibility of two way causation between political survival and
economic growth. As we would expect, precipitation and rainfall were shown to be weak
instruments. The selectorate theory discussed below also outlines the endogeneity
problem caused by simultaneity.
2.2 The Selectorate Theory

Mesquita et al. (2003) present the selectorate theory in order to analyze political survival,
and one can see from their argument how income inequality and political survival are
endogenous. The selectorate theory is founded upon two main terms: the selectorate and
the winning coalition. The selectorate is defined as the set of people whose endowments
include the qualities or characteristics institutionally required to choose the government's
leadership and necessary for gaining access to private benefits given out by the
government's leadership. In general, the selectorate is the set of people who can 'select'
their leader.
16

The winning coalition is defined as a subset of the selectorate of sufficient size such that
the subset's support endows the leadership with political power over the remainder of the
selectorate as well as over the disenfranchise members of the society. In exchange for
their support, members of the winning coalition receive a share of whatever private
benefits the incumbent leader give out to her supporters.
Figure 1: Diagram illustrating the relationship between Winning Coalition and the
Selectorate

In a hereditary monarchy, the lineage required for selectorate membership occurs among

a definite subset of the population: the aristocracy or nobility. Anyone in that subset, by
definition, is adequately endowed with the quality of lineage. The winning coalition must
include approximately a simple majority of those with the necessary lineage. Therefore,
in a strictly hereditary system, a majority of the relevant aristocracy's support is sufficient
to ensure that an individual becomes or remains a monarch. Here, both the selectorate and
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the winning coalition are small, with the ratio of the winning coalition to the selectorate
being approximately one-half.
In a true democracy, the selectorate is the entire population of citizens who have the right
to vote, while the winning coalition is that majority subset of the selectorate whose votes
enable the leader to be elected. Here, both the selectorate and the winning coalition are
large, with the ratio of the winning coalition to the selectorate also being approximately
one-half.
However, a winning coalition can be considerably less than half of the selectorate in a
rigged electoral system, like the systems that have operated in Iraq, Kenya, and many
other places, including the Soviet Union. In the Soviet Union for instance, the selectorate
consisted of as many as all adult citizens, while the winning coalition consisted of the
subset of the selectorate and in addition, who possessed a defined special proficiency,
including a membership in the Communist Party.
The fundamental premise in selectorate theory is that the primary goal of a leader is to
remain in power. To remain in power, leaders must maintain their winning coalition.
When the winning coalition is small, as in autocracies, the leader will tend to use private
goods to satisfy the coalition. When the winning coalition is large, as in democracies, the
leader will tend to use public goods to satisfy the coalition.
In the Soviet Union, the small winning coalition was given access to special privileges
not granted to the rest of the selectorate. George Arbatov (1993) observed:
"The number of people who received various perks grew constantly under Khruschchev
and Brezhnev, keeping up with the growth in sheer numbers of the party's administrative
18

system. People abused these privileges shamelessly, even flaunted them. They lived with
an incredible extravagance and a luxury that bordered on the absurd."
Mesquita et al. (2003) have argued that leaders survive longest when they depend on a
small coalition and a large selectorate, because it is easier to satisfy a small coalition.
They also do least under these conditions to promote the well-being of most people living
under their control. It follows from these private benefits doled out to the winning
coalition that inequality is an obvious byproduct. Those people in the winning coalition
who are given private benefits are a lot more well off than those not in the winning
coalition. Hence, there is a simultaneous relationship between the inequality, political
survival and the type of polity.
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CHAPTER THREE
METHODOLOGY

3.1 The Model
Based on literature and real world events, our empirical model can be set up as follows:
(1)

where the dependent variable De,t is equal to 1 if there is an exit of the effective primary
national leader during year t (excluding exits due to natural death or deposition by
another state), and 0 otherwise. This dependent variable covers exits of leaders brought
about by election loss, resignation, loss of cabinet support, loss of the support of the
legislature, sickness, coup, popular revolt, assassination, domestic armed rebellion, and
other means. Ge, 1-1 is the Gini coefficient for income distribution in year t-1. We could
use a longer lag of Gini since Gini coefficients do not show much variation in one year).
X' e, t-j is a vector of time-varying control variables. le is a vector of country fixed effects,
11

is a vector of year fixed effects, and Ee, 1 is an error term, with E(Ee, 1) =0.

The binary dependent variable in equation ( 1) will be estimated using Linear Probability
Model (LPM). For this model, the relationship between dependent and independent
variables is a particularly simple one, and allows the model to be fitted by simple linear
regression. However, the estimated coefficients can imply probabilities outside the unit
interval [O, 1] which is why we also estimate the above equation using a lo git model. A
probit model, however might not be suited to a fixed effects treatment (Greene 2000).
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The logit function or the log-odds is the logarithm of the odds pl(1-p) where p is the
probability that the leader will exit. This gives the odds ratio, which we later backtransform the estimated regression coefficients off of the log scale so that we can
interpret the conditional effects of each variable.
Survival analysis is also a particularly suitable method for analysis, given that it is a
collection of statistical procedures for data analysis for which the outcome variable of
interest is time until an event occurs (Kleinbaum and Klein, 1996). This method is
generally used in epidemiology and health related research, as outcome variable of
interests are usually death, disease incidence, or some other individual experience. The
event of interest in this thesis is the exit of the political leader, and the outcome variable
of interest is time until the leader exits.
Survival analysis is very well suited to handle the analytical problem of censored data. In
essence, censoring occurs when we have some information about individual survival
time, but we don't know the survival time exactly. A type of censored data is when a
leader does not experience an exit before the end of the dataset, i.e. the year 2016.
President Barack Obama' s incumbency is an example of censored data, since his exit
from office was after 2016. Similar to the odds ratio given by the logit model, the cox
proportional hazard model gives an estimate of the hazard rate. The hazard rate can be
interpreted as the instantaneous potential per unit time for the event to occur, given that
the individual has survived. It is calculated as:
P(t :5 T < t +flt IT;::: t)
h(t) = I i m - - - - - - - flt

Llt->o
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In mathematical terms, the 'given' part of the formula for the hazard function is found in
the probability statement in the numerator to the right of the limit sign. This statement is
a conditional probability because it is of the form, "P of A, given B," where the P denotes
probability and where the long vertical line separating A from B denotes "given." In the
hazard formula, the conditional probability gives the probability that a person's survival
time, T, will lie in the time interval between t and t + i1t, given that the survival time is
greater than or equal to t. Because of the given sign here, the hazard function is
sometimes called a conditional failure rate.
In Kleinbaum's (1996) own words, "To get an idea of what we mean by instantaneous
potential, consider the concept of velocity. If, for example, you are driving in your car
and you see that your speedometer is registering 60 mph, what does this reading mean? It
means that if in the next hour, you continue to drive this way, with the speedometer
exactly on 60, you would cover 60 miles. This reading gives the potential, at the moment
you have looked at your speedometer, for how many miles you will travel in the next
hour. However, because you may slow down or speed up or even stop during the next
hour, the 60-mph speedometer reading does not tell you the number of miles you really
will cover in the next hour. The speedometer tells you only how fast you are going at a
given moment; that is, the instrument gives your instantaneous potential or velocity."
Given the i1t in the denominator, the hazard is a rate rather than a probability. Similar to
the idea of velocity, a hazard function h(t) gives the instantaneous potential at time t for
getting an event, in this case, exit from office, given survival up to time t. This will
hopefully be elucidated after we interpret results from the Cox model in the following
chapter.
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We control for time-varying factors such as the growth rate per capita, as measured by
the GDP growth per capita (Burke, 2012). We lag the growth per capita by one year in
hopes of circumventing the endogeneity problem here. By lagging it by one year, we are
assuming that the political leader in power does not influence the GDP growth rate of a
year ago. The log of GDP per capita is also used to control for the level of development
attained by the country. This is not considered endogenous since GDP moves relatively
slowly and by the time the leaders come in power, relatively equivalent level of
development would already have been achieved. Secondary school enrollment is also
included as a control variable since it could be a latent but important variable determining
political survival. Many autocratic regimes, including the Rana regime of Nepal (1846 to
1951 AD), had it in their interest to suppress education in hopes that the public might not
awaken to their tyranny. Highly educated people are a potential threat to autocrats, and so
autocrats make sure to limit educational opportunity. They want workers to have basic
labor skills like literacy, but they want their own children to be well educated, and so
send them off to schools in places like Switzerland, the United States and the United
Kingdom. In fact, one might say that Oxford University is a breeding ground for
authoritarians. It is the alma mater of many, including Zimbabwe's Robert Mugabe, the
Bhutto family of Pakistan, kings of Jordan, Bhutan, Malaysia, and even little Tonga.
It is important to include urban concentration as a control variable. In "Cities and
Stability", Jeremy L. Wallace (2014) provides an in-depth analysis of how cities function
and how they provide a strong base for revolutions to ignite and overthrow the current
regime. Historically speaking, most downfall of dictators, autocrats, and monarchs has
been the effect of uprisings and revolutions in cities.
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We follow Burke (2012) and we add leader specific control variables such as tenure, age
and sex. Tenure is included to see how the probability of exit in the following year
changes given that a leader has survived up to the current year. Burke (2012) showed that
a strong ageing effect exists in that old leaders are generally voted out of office than
young ones. A dummy variable for female is included to see whether male leaders or
female leaders have higher probabilities for survival.
A few other dummy variables are included to control for other exogenous factors. A
dummy equal to 1 for the years 1989 - 1992 (or another time period) for countries
classified as transition economies by the Development Research Institute (DRI 2009) and
0 otherwise is included as a control variable since there are quicker exits during
transitions (Burke, 2012). Dummies for elections that affect the effective primary
national leader, a dummy for exit due to sickness, a dummy for exit due to death, and a
dummy for the year of a legal term limit are also included to control for exits other than a
regular exit.

3.2 Simultaneous Equations Modelling
The selectorate theory illustrates the problem of simultaneity bias. Inequality and political
survival are simultaneously determined from the size of the winning coalition. The size of
the winning coalition affects both inequality and the survival of political leaders. The
figure below shows the relationship between the size of the winning coalition, income
inequality and political survival.
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Figure 2: Theoretical framework derived.from the selectorate theory

I

Inequality

Political
Survival

Mesquita et al. use an extremely crude method of estimating the size of the winning
coalition and the selectorate. In their own words, "Their objective is to evaluate the
general tendency for the predictions of the selectorate model to be a significant
component of broad array of phenomena, and not to maximize the variance explained for
any dependent variable." The way they estimate the sizes of the winning coalition and the
selectorate is through a combination of institutional variables collected from POLITY IV
and Arthur Banks' cross-national time-series data. An institutional variable called
Legislative Selection (LEGSELEC) is used as an indicator of the size of the selectorate.
This is a categorical variable that takes a value of 0 if there is no legislature, 1 if the
legislature is chosen by heredity, and 2 if the members of the legislature are directly or
indirectly selected by popular election. Similarly, the authors estimate the size of the
winning coalition by using a composite of variables from the POLITY database.
We do not use the method used by Mesquita et al. for two main reasons. First, the authors
have treated the coding convention (0, 1, or 2) as if it were a scale. They seem to have
arbitrarily constrained the coefficient of the size of the selectorate, such that one value
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would be twice the value of another. In other words, a LEGSELEC value of 2 would have
double the selectorate size than a LEGSELEC value of 1. Secondly, the size of the
winning coalition is almost perfectly correlated with the Polity variable, which measures
the degree of democracy. Including the size of the winning coalition and the Polity
variable will lead to a multicollinearity problem.
The Polity variable itself is therefore, used in place of the size of the winning coalition.
There are three reasons why using the polity variable instead of the size of the winning
Figure 3: Theoretical framework for the Structural Equations Model

Inequality

Political
Survival

coalition is justified. First, the use of polity variable, which could be thought of as the
degree of democracy, is much more intuitive and simpler than winning coalition size.
Second, it is readily available from the POLITY IV database, and does not require
arbitrarily selecting institutional variables as done by Mesquita et al. Finally, the highly
significant correlation coefficient of 0.89 between the size of the winning coalition and
the polity variable suggesting that autocracies usually have small winning coalitions,
while democracies have a large winning coalition, ensures that we are basically
measuring the same thing.
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In order to separate the effects of income inequality on political survival, we construct a
Structural Equations Model (SEM) with two separate equations. The structural equation
is given as:

(2)
(3)

Where,
G = Gini Coefficient
Polity= Type of polity, tends to 1 if country is democratic and tends to 0 if autocratic
D =Dummy variable, =1 if there was exit of one or more leaders
X' = Vector of time-varying control variables
E

= Error term
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CHAPTER FOUR
DATA

Data was collected from a variety of sources and includes 152 countries for the period
1962 - 2015. The data for political leaders was collected from a dataset called Archigos,
which detailed the entry date and exit date of politicians from the 1800s to 2015.
Inequality data was collected from the World Inequality Database (WID) maintained by
an international academic consortium. Data was filtered to produce consistent estimates
of the Gini coefficient of inequality. The Gini index or the Gini coefficient is a statistical
measure of distribution which was developed by the Italian statistician Corrado Gini in
1912. After arranging all households from the poorest to the richest, a Lorenz curve can
be drawn by plotting cumulative percentages of the households against the corresponding
cumulative percentages of income they receive. Gini coefficient can then be calculated as
a ratio of the area between the Lorenz curve and the line of perfect equality (the 45° line)
to the entire area below the 45 ° line. Another way of thinking about the Gini coefficient
is as a measure of deviation from perfect equality. The further a Lorenz curve deviates
Figure 4: The Lorenz.
curve
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from the perfectly equal straight line (which represents a Gini coefficient of 0), the higher
the Gini coefficient and the less equal the society.
Another important database was the Polity IV data, which detailed the various aspects of
democracy in a country. Other covariates like percentage of population with secondary
education, GDP growth per capita, demographic data, and others were collected from the
World Bank database, World Development Indicators.
A quick glance at the data shows that there was a total of 1247 exits of leaders and out of
that 809 were 'regular' exits (after discounting for leaders who left office due to death,
sickness or by reaching the end of their term limit). Only 51 of these politicians were
female, while the mean age of the politician at the time of their exit is 58 years. 229
leaders were deposed in their first year in office, while only 69 leaders lasted more than
10 years. The leader, Hassanal Bolkiah from Brunei has the longest tenure of 52 years,
while also being the incumbent today.
The data also shows that autocrats seem to survive longer than their democratic
counterparts, as the farmer's average tenure in is 8.7 years, while the latter enjoys an
average of 3.6 years in office. Income inequality, however, is only slightly higher in
autocracies, with a mean Gini coefficient of 0.42 than in democracies, with a mean score
of 0.38. This inequality variable is almost bimodal, as the Gini score ranging between
0.25 to 0.27 and between 0.46 to 0.5 have the highest frequencies.
The summary statistics are given in the table below.
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Ta hie I:

S11111111c1r\·

Statistics

Variable

Obs

Mean

Std.

Min

Max
0

1

15.55

78.6

Dummy

7839

0.159332 0.366357

Gini Coefficient

2969

38.81891

Growth Per Capita (Lagged)

8209

0.043724 0.149365

Log of GDP per capita

8592

22.82338

2.550038

15.99304

30.5555

Urban Concentration

8284

33.66557

17.15468 2.867021

100

Secondary Enrollment

7360

61.55373

34.68608

0

166.154

Tenure

7672

5.749739 7.129686

0

48

Age

7672

56.29262

11.09032

17

99

10716

0.011385

0.106096

0

1

Polity

8036

0.548637

0.370435

0

1

Female

7672

0.035454 0.184935

0

1

Term Limit

7120

0.036236

0.18689

0

1

Sick dummy

7839

0.002551

0.05045

0

1

Death dummy

7839

0.007909 0.088587

0

1

Elections

8364

0

1

Transition Period

0.18221

11.44815

0.38604

-3.12912 0.799368

A list of countries and their Gini coefficients for the year 2015 are given in Table 2.
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Tah/e 2: Countries und their Ginis os 0(2015

Gini::;35

35<Gini::;45

Gini>45

Canada

31.6 United States

44.685

Honduras

49.59

United Kingdom

34.2 Dominican Republic

44.695

Costa Rica

48.34

Ireland

29.8 El Salvador

40.575

Ecuador

45.925

Netherlands

28.5 Argentina

Brazil

51.315

Belgium

26.5 Uruguay

40.18 Bolivia

Luxembourg

28.5 Lithuania

37.55

France
Switzerland
Spain

29.35 Israel

Germany

29.85

Poland

32.6

Austria

27.4

Hungary

27.5

Slovak Republic

24.4

Italy

32.4

Malta

28.1

Slovenia

24.75
34.1

Cyprus

33.6

Estonia

33.9
35

Finland

25.6

Sweden

27.25

Norway

25.55

Denmark

27.4

Iceland

24.7

31

46.715
51.10833
48.5

South Africa

65.5

China

46.2

Sri Lanka

30.755

Greece

Latvia

41.14333

34.55
33.8

Paraguay

36 Chile

29.6 Malaysia

Portugal

Croatia

40.5
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The bimodal nature of income inequality is shown in figure 1.
Figure 5: Histogram for Gini Coeffi cient
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Given this bimodal nature, we can divide all observations into two major groups: one
with low inequality and one with high inequality. The low inequality group include those
observations that have a Gini coefficient less than the mean of 38.82, while the high
inequality group includes observations whose Gini coefficient is higher than the mean.
Figure 6: Survival curves f or countries with high inequality and lo w inequality
Kaplan-Meier survival estimates

~
~

LO
f'-.

c::i
0

LO

c::i
LO

C\J

c::i

---""""--

,_,_"-------.._ ____ _

8
c::i

0

10

20
30
analysis time

=

- - gini_dummy O
- - - - - gini_dummy = 1

40

- Low Inequality
- High Inequality

32

50

A preliminary survival function graph shows that leaders tend to survive a lot more in
highly unequal societies after they stay in office for a couple years. In both groups,
around 80% of leaders survive their first year in office. Both groups have a similar
survival rate up until around the 5 year mark, after which the difference is drastic. By
simply eyeballing the graph, it can be seen that 37% of the leaders in the group with high
income inequality survive IO years in office, while only around 20% of the leaders in the
group with low income inequality survive the same number of years. The survival
function graph also illustrates that no leaders in the group with low income inequality
survive more than 18 years while there are still 25% of the leaders in the unequal
societies surviving more than the same number of years.
Table 3: Log rank testfor equalitr

(~(sunfra!fimctions

Events
Events
Gini_dummy observed expected
0
1
Total

215
593

156.16
651.84

808

808

chi2(1)
Pr>chi2

31.82
0.000

A log-rank test that tests for the null hypothesis of equal survival functions is rejected at
the 1% significance level and thus shows that the two survival curves are statistically
different from one another.

33

CHAPTER FIVE
RESULTS
5.1 Preliminary Results
We use three models to estimate the effects of income inequality on political survival.
The results from a linear probability model, a logit model and a cox proportional hazard
model is given below.
Tahle 4: Regression Results

Gini

Growth per capita (lagged)

Urban concentration

Secondary Enrollment

Tenure

Age

Transition period

Polity

Female

Term limit

LPM

Lo git

Cox Proportional

-0.00391 ***

-0.0406***

-0.0235***

(0.00105)

(0.0101)

(0.00633)

-0.0441

-1.199*

-0.229

(0.0711)

(0.621)

(0.322)

-0.000234

-0.00143

-0.00192

(0.000892)

(0.00579)

(0.00388)

-0.00103**

-0.00876**

-0.00597**

(0.000404)

(0.00425)

(0.00264)

0.000807

0.0104

0.061

(0.0025)

(0.0200)

0

0.00212**

0.0190**

0.0147***

(0.000975)

(0.00799)

(0.00552)

0.301 **

1.934***

1.236***

(0.126)

(0.595)

(0.417)

0.104**

1.244***

0.827**

(0.043)

(0.396)

(0.326)

-0.0641 ***

-0.760**

-0.410*

(0.0193)

(0.359)

(0.215)

0.782***

7.070***

1.756***

34

(0.0277)
Sick Dummy

Death Dummy

Election (constructed)

(1.019)

(0.129)

0.795***

1.635***

(0.065)

(0.466)

0.705***

1.399***

(0.05)

(0.376)

0.233***

1.855***

1.028***

(0.0295)

(0.153)

(0.107)

0.126*

-1.516

(0.0688)

(1.512)

Year FE

YES

YES

YES

Observations

2,019

2,005

2,019

Number of countries

93

93

Constant

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

All three models show a negative relationship between income inequality and the
probability of exit. These results are consistent with the Kaplan-Meier survival graph
which showed that leaders tend to survive more in highly unequal societies. The LPM
model shows that a one-point increase in the Gini coefficient decreases the probability of
the incumbent leader exiting office the following year by 0.03%, ceteris paribus.
Similarly, the logit model shows a 4% decrease in the odds of exiting office holding all
other factors constant, since e-0 ·0415

=0.96. The marginal effects that show the change in

probability when the independent variables increase by one unit, are shown in Table 5
below.
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Tahle 5: Marginlll E.ffects
(1)

VARIABLES

Dummy

Gini
Growth per capita (lagged)
Urban concentration
Secondary Enrollment
Tenure
Age
Transition period
Polity
Female
Term limit

-0.00499***
(0.00123)
-0.148*
(0.0766)
-0.000176
(0.000712)
-0.00108**
(0.000522)
0.00127
(0.00246)
0.00234**
(0.000980)
0.238***
(0.0739)
0.153***
(0.0488)
-0.0936**
(0.0442)
0.870***
(0.162)

Sick Dummy (omitted)
Death Dummy (omitted)
0.228***
(0.0207)

Election (constructed)

2,005

Observations

Table 5 above shows that at the mean values, the change in probability of leader exit
given a one unit change in the Gini Coefficient is a decrease by 0.499 percentage points.
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The leader specific control variables sick dummy and death dummy are omitted because
they predict exit perfectly. The classification statistics for this logistic regression is given
in Table 6.
Tahle 6: Clos.\{(irntion Stotistics

Classified

-D

D

+
Total

Total

181

28

209

215

1581

1796

396

1609

2005

Classified+ if predicted Pr(D)

>=

0.5

TRUED defined as Dummy

<>

0

Sensitivity

Pr(+j D)

45.71%

Specificity

Pr(-!- D)

98.26%

Positive predicted value

Pr(D I+)

86.60%

Negative predicted value

Pr(-D j -)

88.03%

FALSE+ for true -D

Pr(+i-D)

1.74%

FALSE - for true D

Pr(-! D)

54.29%

FALSE + rate for classified +

Pr(-D I+)

13.40%

FALSE - rate for classified -

Pr(D

1-)

11.97%
87.88%

Correctly classified

The overall rate of correct classification is estimated to be 87.88, with 98.26% of the
leaders remaining in power correctly classified (specificity), and 45.71 % of the leader
exits correctly classified (sensitivity).
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In the Cox Model, the negative coefficient of 0.0235 translates to a decreased risk of
exiting office of 2.32% (calculated as 1 - e- 0·0235 ) when the Gini coefficient increases by 1
point, controlling for all other covariates. In other words, a unit increase in the Gini
coefficient increases the hazard rate, or the instantaneous potential for exiting office by
2.32%.
Results on the control variables indicate that a strong ageing effect exists: older leaders
are statistically more likely to lose their jobs, even after controlling for tenure. All else
equal, higher secondary enrollment is associated with lower probability of exit. This
could be because the public might assign this improvement in their country to their
respective leaders and believe that the leader helped achieve this improvement. Leaders
of transition economies were more likely to lose office. Unsurprisingly, leaders are more
likely to lose office subsequent to elections, upon reaching their term limit, and upon
leaving due to sickness and death. Female leaders tend to last more in office than their
male counterparts, and autocratic leaders tend to last more in office given the positive
coefficient on the polity variable.

5.2 Robustness Check
Given the bimodal nature of the Gini Coefficient, a robustness analysis is conducted to
see whether the results change when the assumptions change. There may be uncertainty
regarding the model specification but a robustness test can improve the validity of
inferences (Plumper and Neumayer, 2017).
An additional dummy variable is created, which takes a value of 1 if the Gini Coefficient
is greater than 40, and 0 if otherwise. The number 40 is selected since it separates
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observations into roughly two normal distributions with separates modes as shown in
Figure 1. Another form of robustness check is conducted by excluding all observations
between 36 and 39, and redoing the estimation.
The regression results in table 4 show that the dummy variable for high Gini Coefficients
are statistically significant at the 5% significance level. Column 1 is a re-estimation of the
first column from Table 3 with the additional dummy variable for high Gini coefficients.
Column 2 is also the same as Column 1 with only one difference: the estimation in the
second column excludes all observations with Gini Coefficients between 36 and 39.
Similarly, columns 3 and 4 is a re-estimation of the Lo git model from table 3, and column
5 and 6 is a re-estimation of the Cox Proportional model.
In all six models, highly unequal societies have a significantly lower probability of leader
exit than societies with low Gini Coefficients. The LPM estimate for the Gini dummy in
column 1, for instance, is -0.0936 which means that highly unequal countries have a
lower probability of leader exit than that in countries with low inequality by 0.0936. The
results hold for all six models.
Tahle 7: Ro/Justness Check

VARIABLES
Gini

High Gini dummy

Growth PC

1

2

3

4

5

6

LPM

LPM2

Lo git

Logit2

Stcox

Stcox2

-0.0005

-0.00053

-0.00194

-0.00642

-0.00322

-0.00388

(0.00162)

(0.0017)

(0.017)

(0.0185)

(0.0102)

(0.0108)

-0.0936**

-0.0847**

-1.195***

-1.024**

-0.552**

-0.495**

(0.0384)

(0.0383)

(0.38)

(0.43)

(0.223)

(0.245)

-0.0474

-0.0808

-0.603

-0.915

-0.265

-0.365

(0.0708)

(0.0581)

(0.553)

(0.6)

(0.325)

(0.327)

39

Urban

Secondary Enroll

Tenure

Age

Transition Period

Polity

Female

Term Limit

Sick dummy

Death dummy

Election

Constant

Observations
Number of c_id

-0.00013

2.72E-05

-0.00167

0.000977

-0.00144

-0.00094

(0.00088)

(0.00085)

(0.00897)

(0.00951)

(0.00386)

(0.00404)

-0.00113***

-0.000985**

-0.0118***

-0.0119**

-0.00663**

-0.00685**

(0.00041)

(0.00041)

(0.00434)

(0.00482)

(0.00263)

(0.00291)

0.000954

0.00540**

0.0529**

0.0653***

0.137

0.448

(0.00243)

(0.00247)

(0.023)

(0.0245)

(0.000)

(0.000)

0.00217**

0.00218**

0.0221 **

0.0215**

0.0144***

0.0155***

(0.00097)

(0.00086)

(0.00935)

(0.00985)

(0.00551)

(0.00574)

0.304**

0.319**

1.969***

2.277***

1.253***

1.369***

(0.13)

(0.127)

(0.607)

(0.641)

(0.417)

(0.425)

0.104**

0.136***

1.206***

1.679***

0.823**

1.147***

(0.0409)

(0.0443)

(0.465)

(0.542)

(0.324)

(0.374)

-0.0587***

-0.0648***

-0.830**

-0.885**

-0.373*

-0.394*

(0.0192)

(0.0184)

(0.384)

(0.404)

(0.215)

(0.221)

0.787***

0.798***

6.967***

6.996***

1.789***

1.775***

(0.0275)

(0.0313)

(0.779)

(0.792)

(0.13)

(0.134)

0.781 ***

0.777***

20.15

21.51

1.563***

1.747***

(0.065)

(0.0747)

(3,909)

(7,916)

(0.468)

(0.512)

0.705***

0.692***

19.23

20.29

1.367***

1.318***

(0.0498)

(0.0473)

(2,683)

(4,318)

(0.376)

(0.381)

0.232***

0.230***

1.836***

1.902***

1.021 ***

1.050***

(0.0296)

(0.0296)

(0.156)

(0.164)

(0.107)

(0.111)

0.0368

-0.0274

-3.554***

-3.990***

(0.000)

(0.0842)

(0.905)

(0.99)

2,019

1,897

2,019

1,897

2,019

1,897

93

92

93

92

The results of all models as well as the Kaplan Meier survival graph support the
hypothesis that high inequality is associated with longer political survival. Income
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inequality and political survival could very well be endogenous, as suggested by the
selectorate theory. Using lagged income inequality gives out similar results to that of
table 3. It could very well be that highly unequal societies are the by-product of a
political system where the exit of a leader is unlikely. This possibly explains the
significant negative sign on the Gini Coefficient in the three regression models.
Table R: A correlation matrix shm\'s that as polities 11101·e tmrnrds democracies,
i11eq11a Ii t_\· f(1 I ls

Gini
Gini
Polity

Polity
1

-0.2129

1

We move ahead with the simultaneous equations model. The log of GDP is also used as
an independent variable to satisfy the order condition for parameter identification.
We then construct another Kaplan Meier survival function based on Polity_dummy. This
polity dummy takes the value of 1 if the country is relatively democratic, i.e., its polity
score is greater than 0.5, and 0 if otherwise.
The survival graphs show what was predicted from the selectorate theory. Autocrats tend
to survive a lot more in office than do democrats. Even more interestingly, it is very
difficult for autocrats to survive their early years in office, even harder than for democrats
if we look at just the first year. For autocrats, it is hard to find sources of revenues to
satisfy their winning coalition in their first year. It comes of no surprise that we often see
looting, confiscations, and extractions during political transitions.
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Figure 7: Surl'ival curve for leaders in autocracies and democracies

Kaplan-Meier survival estimates
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5.3 Simultaneous Equations Model Results
The regression results from the SEM model is shown below.

Table 9: Simultaneous Equations Model Results
VARIABLES

Gini Coefficient

dummy
-0.00391 ***
(0.00079)
0.301 ***
(0.107)
-0.0441
(0.0607)
-0.00103 ***
(0.00033)
0.000807
(0.00216)
0.00212***
(0.00074)
-0.0641 ***

Gini coefficient
Transition Period
Growth per capita (lagged)
Secondary Enrollment
Tenure
Age
Female
42
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Urban Concentration
Polity

(0.0213)
-0.00023
(0.00049)
0.104***
(0.0326)
0.782***
(0.0186)
0.233***
(0.0214)
0.795***
(0.0595)
0.705***
(0.0402)

0.108***
(0.0176)
-5.769***
(0.849)

Term Limit
Election
Sick dummy
Death dummy
GDP per capita (Logged)
Constant

Observations

-1.781 ***
(0.143)
85.70***
(3.628)

0.126*
(0.066)

2,019

2,019

The results shown above in table 4 provide estimates of how the type of polity
simultaneously influence income inequality as well as the survival of leaders. Looking at
the first column in table 4, the type of polity negatively affects income inequality.
Autocratic countries are associated with higher income inequality, while democratic
countries have lower income inequality. Similarly, the log of GDP per capita is also seen
to be negatively related with Gini coefficients. Rich countries and countries that have
attained a certain level of development generally have lower Gini coefficients, and thus
lower income inequality. Finally, the urban concentration variable has a positive
coefficient which implies that countries with higher urban concentration generally have
higher income inequality. This is consistent with prior literatures and intuitive thinking.
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The results of the second equation are identical with results from the LPM, Logit and the
Cox Proportional Hazard Model. Income inequality is still negatively correlated with the
probability that a leader is going to exit office. A high level of inequality could be a sign
that the winning coalition is deriving private benefits from the incumbent leader while
citizens not in the winning coalition are not gaining or gaining very few benefits (mostly
public) from the policies set by the incumbent leader. This could be one reason why
higher inequality induces the winning coalition to keep the incumbent leader in power.
The effect on other covariates have also not changed. Secondary enrollment are
significant at the 1% significance level, and are negatively associated with the probability
that a leader exits office. The ageing effect still exists as old leaders have more of a
tendency to exit out of office, even after we control for tenure. Females last longer in
office than their male counterparts. However, this could be because out of our sample of
1981 observation, there were only 61 female leaders. Finally, leaders have a higher
probability of exit during periods of transition. Like before, it is not surprising that
leaders tend to exit a lot more during elections, and at the end of their term limits.
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CONCLUSION

This paper explores whether a nation's level of income inequality affects the short-run
political survival prospects of that nation's leader. The simultaneous equations model
controls for the simultaneity bias between the size of the winning coalition, income
inequality and probability of leader exit. The results provide evidence that higher income
inequality increases the likelihood that national leaders will retain their position.
There have been no studies that have typically examined the effect of income inequality
on democratic election results. This paper provides causal evidence of a relationship
between income inequality and political survival that extends beyond the ballot box. The
magnitude of the estimated impact of income inequality on political survival is quite
small. The SEM estimate in column 2 of Table 5 indicates that a one point increase in the
Gini Coefficient reduces the probability of leader change by 0.4%.
The results provide important lessons for the rich who want to stay rich, for autocrats, or
even budding dictators. For the rich, it is easier to protect their fortunes simply by
maintaining their political support to leaders in order to protect their wealth, or income.
Autocrats and dictators can use these results as evidence to back up one of Mesquita and
Smith's (2011) rules for successful dictatorship: Don't take your friends' money and
redistribute it to the masses.
The findings of this paper have important implications. We can understand why some
believe that stable leadership is good for economic well-being. But autocrats do not grow
more efficient at improving their society over time. The uncertainty provoked by
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instability might be thought to scare investors, but those effects - if they exist at all - are
offset by the advantages inherent in political competition.
Policy changes need to address the political incentives for greedy, corrupt and rentseeking governance. The mechanism with which political leaders stay in power by
appealing to the rich, or how the rich enable the political leaders they support to stay in
power need to be addressed. The political transition from a society ruled by an exclusive
group to one with a broad, inclusive coalition structure, i.e. a more democratic polity,
appears to be fundamental for sustained improvement in the quality of life for the world's
economically, socially, or politically oppressed people.
Further research could be done to refine the effect of inequality on political survival. We
could see if the results improve or worsen when we use wealth inequality, instead of
using income inequality. Introducing taxation and/or spending on public goods might
help shed some light on how attempts to reduce inequality (if they exist at all) may
impact prospects of survival.
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Appendix: Variable Definitions
Exit of leader in year: Binary variable= 1 if there are one or more exits of the effective
primary national leader during the year for reasons other than natural death or foreign
deposition; 0 otherwise. Goemans et al. (2009).
Gini Coefficient: Measure of income inequality. Higher Gini coefficients indicate higher
income inequality. World Inequality Database (2015)
GDP per capita growth: Annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita based on
constant local currency. World Bank (2015).
Urban concentration: The share of the urban population in a country that lives in its
largest city. Calculated by dividing population estimate for the largest city by the total
urban population of the country. United Nation's Population Division's World
Urbanization Prospects (2009).
Secondary enrollment rate (% gross): Number of pupils enrolled in secondary education,
regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the population in the theoretical age group
for secondary education. Data from the World Bank (2016b) and DRI (2009). Data are
interpolated (linear).
Tenure of leader in power at start of year (years): Sum of 31 Decembers that the leader
has been in office during current tenure. Calculated for leader in office on 1 January
using Goemans et al. (2009).
Age of leader in power at start of year (years): Calendar year minus birth year of leader in
office on 1 January, calculated using Goemans et al. (2009).
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Transition dummy: Binary variable, = 1 for the years 1989-1992 for transition economies;
0 otherwise. DRI (2009).
POLITY2 (rescaled): Revised Combined Polity Score of the Polity IV Project. Marshall
et al. (2010). Rescaled so it ranges from 0 (full autocracy) to 1 (full democracy).
Female dummy: Binary variable, =1 if effective national leader is female; 0 otherwise.
Goemans et al. (2009).
Term limit dummy: Binary variable, = 1 if national leader left office due to legal
requirement during year; 0 otherwise. Self-constructed. Does not include cases in which a
national leader avoided a requirement to leave office.
Sick dummy: Binary variable, = 1 if national leader left office due to sickness during year;
0 otherwise. Self-construction.
Death dummy: Binary variable, =1 if national leader died while in office; 0 otherwise.
Self-construction.
Election dummy: Binary variable, =1 if an election affecting the effective national leader
occurred during the year; 0 otherwise. Constructed with election data from Goemans
(2009) using the following operation on six binary variables: Presidential election
(0,l)*Leader subject to presidential elections (0,1) +Parliamentary election (O,l)*Leader
subject to parliamentary elections (0, 1) + Presidential or parliamentary election
(O,l)*Assemblyelected president (0,1). Beck et al. (2001) and other sources used to
allocate leaders to elections.

48

REFERENCES
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., Robinson, J.A. and Yared P. (2008). 'Income and
democracy', American Economic Review, 98, 808-842.
Alesina, A., Ozier, S., Roubini, N. and Swagel, P. (1996). 'Political instability and
economic growth', Journal of Economic Growth, 1, 189-211.
Barro, R.J. (1991 ). 'Economic growth in a cross section of countries', Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 106, 407-443.
Bonica, A., McCarty, N., Poole, K. T., & Rosenthal, H. (2013). Why hasn't democracy
slowed rising inequality?. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 27(3), 103-24.
Bruckner, M. and Ciccone, A. (2010). 'International commodity prices, growth and the
outbreak of civil war in sub-Saharan Africa', Economic Journal, 120, 519-534.
Brunetti, A. ( 1997). Politics and Economic Growth: A Cross-Country Data Perspective,
Development Centre of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development, Paris.
De Mesquita, B. B., & Smith, A. (2011). The dictator's handbook: why bad behavior is
almost always good politics. PublicAffairs.
De Mesquita, B. B., Smith, A., Morrow, J. D., & Siverson, R. M. (2005). The logic of
political survival. MIT press.
De Solla Price, D.J. (1963). Little science, big science. New York: Columbia University
Press.

49

Fenner, T., Levene, M., & Loizou, G. (2010). "Predicting the long tail of book sales:
Unearthing the power-law exponent." Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and Its
Applications, 389, 2416-2421.
Global Wealth Report (2015). Retrieved from https://publications.creditsuisse.com/tasks/render/filc/?file ID=F24254 l 5-DC A 7-8088EAD989AF934 l D47E
Glaeser, E., Scheinkman, J., & Shleifer, A. (2003). The injustice of inequality. Journal
of Monetary Economics, 50(1), 199-222.
Goemans, H.E., Gleditsch, K.S. and Chiozza, G. (2009). 'Introducing Archigos: A
dataset of political leaders', Journal of Peace Research, 46, 269-283.
Huntington, S.P. (1968). Political Order in Changing Societies, Yale University Press,
New Haven, CT.
Huntington, S.P. (1991). The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth
Century, University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, OK.
Kuznets, S. (1955). Economic growth and income inequality. The American economic
review, 45(1), 1-28.
Meltzer, A.H., & Richard, S. F. (1983). Tests of a rational theory of the size of
government. Public Choice, 41(3), 403-418.
Olson, M. Jr. (1963). 'Rapid growth as a destabilizing force', Journal of Economic
History, 23, 529-552.

so

Przeworski, A., Alvarez, M.E., Cheibub, J.A. and Limongi, F. (2000). Democracy and
Development: Political Institutions and the Well-Being of the World, 1950-1990,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
Pliimper, T., & Neumayer, E. (2017). Robustness Tests and Statistical Inference.
Robert Woodward, Obama's War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2010)
Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days (New York: W.W. Norton, 1969).
Roberts, R. (2016). Bruce Bueno de Mesquita on the Spoils of War. EconTalk Podcast.

51

ANNEX
Figure 9: Survival curve for leaders in high growth countries vs low growth countries

Kaplan-Meier survival estimates
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Figure JO: Survival curve for leaders in high GDP countries vs low GDP countries

Kaplan-Meier survival estimates
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Figure 11: Survival Curves for Low Urban Concentration countries vs High Urban
Concentration countries

Kaplan-Meier survival estimates
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Figure 12: Survival curve for leaders in high secondary enrollment countries vs low
secondary enrollment countries
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Figure 13: Survival curve for young vs old leaders

Kaplan-Meier survival estimates
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Figure 14: Survival curvesfor male leaders vs.female leaders
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0.0074

0.0925

Term Limit

0.017

-0.0006

-0.0201

-0.012

Dummy

Election

Death

Dummy

0.0066

-0.0425

-0.0006

-0.0535

Female

0.0064

-0.0604

0.0305

-0.2129

Polity

Sick

0.047

-0.0254

0.0536

Transition

-0.0323

-0.0046

-0.0095

-0.1771

0.1021

-0.0888

0.0039

0.1063

Age

0.0925

-0.0093

0.009

0.0459

0.1279

0.5115

-0.0822

-0.1675

0.0649

-0.0035

0.0909

Tenure

1

-0.317

0.0094

-0.5404

Sec .Edu

1

-0.0234

1

Sec. Edu

0.3008

-0.0089

1

Cone

PC

Cone

Urban

Growth PC

Gini

Gini

Urban

Growth

Table 10: Correlation Matrix

1

0.0494

-0.0645

-0.0257

0.0556

0.0443

0.0772

0.0395

0.0153

-0.0813

-0.009

0.0929

-0.3834

1
-0.0372

Age

-0.0097

0.2879

Tenure

-0.0119

0.0122

-0.0063

-0.0171

-0.0235

-0.018

1

Transition

1

0.1763

-0.0281

0.0113

0.1279

0.1695

Polity

I

0.0161

-0.0173

0.004

0.0233

Female

1

0.1488

-0.018

-0.0097

Limit

Term

0.0157

-0.0045

1

Dummy

Sick

1
0.0234

Dummy

Death

1

Election

